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KEEPING PUBLIC USE RELEVANT IN 
STADIUM EMINENT DOMAIN TAKINGS: 
THE MASSACHUSETTS WAY 
Steven Chen* 
Abstract: As the sports industry has grown into a multi-billion dollar en-
terprise, cities have increasingly faced the decision of whether to fund ex-
pensive stadium projects to attract or keep franchises. These projects 
commonly include using public funds and the government’s eminent 
domain power under the Public-Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Un-
like traditional public uses such as infrastructure and utilities, multi-
purpose stadiums present a unique challenge for courts. The Second Cir-
cuit in Goldstein v. Pataki handled the public-use analysis by allowing any 
amount of traditional public-use justification to shield a stadium project 
from pretext challenges. This Note argues that by broadening the public-
use analysis, the Goldstein court effectively foreclosed any feasible pretext 
claim against a stadium project, which always has a traditional public-use 
justification. It proposes that in general, the Massachusetts legislature’s 
approach to public-use analysis for stadium construction provides a 
strong starting point in protecting public use from improper private ben-
efits. In Massachusetts, the government grants public funding and land 
condemnation for the portions of a stadium project that satisfy the tradi-
tional public-use analysis, while the government requires teams to pay for 
any portions that only benefit the franchise. In doing so, the state has 
struck a stronger balance between protecting the public from unconstitu-
tional takings while ensuring the viability of future stadium projects. 
Introduction 
 On November 3, 2012, nearly 18,000 basketball fans gathered at the 
Barclays Center, the new state-of-the-art 675,000-square-foot sports arena 
located in the heart of Brooklyn, to watch the inaugural game of the 
city’s new professional basketball franchise, the Brooklyn Nets.1 On 
their way to the $1 billion arena, fans likely walked through the Atlantic 
 
* Executive Comment Editor, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Re-
view, 2012–2013. 
1 Benjamin Hoffman, New Home, New Lineup and a Fresh Result, N.Y. Times, Nov. 3, 
2012, at SP1; Brooklyn Nets News Update, InsideHoops.com, http://www.insidehoops.com/ 
brooklyn-nets.shtml (last updated Apr. 13, 2012). 
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Yards, a proposed $4.9 billion development comprising new luxury 
high-rise condominiums, office buildings, and department stores.2 Nu-
merous city luminaries and celebrities attended the celebration, includ-
ing rapper Jay-Z, who once held a minority stake in the Brooklyn Nets, 
and New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg, who officially broke 
ground for the project in 2010.3 
                                                                                                                     
 What many likely did not realize was that more than fifty years ago, 
a different team planned a similar celebration to take place near the 
same site.4 In 1955, Brooklyn Dodgers owner Walter O’Malley pro-
posed that the city develop a new stadium for his team.5 O’Malley com-
plained that the team had outgrown its stadium, Ebbets Field, and he 
wanted a new, larger, domed ballpark6 at a plot of land at the intersec-
tion of Atlantic Avenue and Flatbush Avenue.7 The Parks Commis-
sioner criticized O’Malley for wanting to use public money and its emi-
nent domain powers to acquire the land and build a sports stadium.8 
When the city denied O’Malley’s request, he entered an agreement 
 
2 See N.R. Kleinfield, For Brooklyn’s New Arena, Day 1 Brings Hip-Hop Fans and Protests, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/29/nyregion/barclays-centers- 
opening-is-met-with-protests.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Liz Robbins, What to Expect in New 
York in 2012: Brooklyn, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/ 
01/01/nyregion/01a-year-ahead-in-new-york.html?amp=&pagewanted=all (follow “Brooklyn” 
hyperlink image of Brooklyn Bridge). 
3 Matt Flegenheimer, For Fans, Debut Is More of an Escape Than a Celebration, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 3, 2012, at SP10; Howard Beck, Jay-Z Makes ‘Brooklyn Nets’ Name Official, Off the 
Dribble, N.Y. Times N.B.A. Blog (Sept. 26, 2011, 12:27 PM), http://offthedribble.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2011/09/26/jay-z-makes-brooklyn-nets-name-official/; Zack O’Malley Green-
burg, Jay-Z Sells Nets Stake, Earns Warren Buffett-Like Return, Forbes.com (Apr. 19, 2013, 3:57 
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2013/04/19/jay-z-sells-nets-stake- 
earns-warren-buffett-like-return/; Press Release, Office of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, 
Mayor Announces New Commitment to Ensure First Residential Building is Affordable, 
PR-108-10 (Mar. 11, 2010), available at www.nyc.gov/html/om/html/2010a/pr108-10.html. 
4 See Norman Oder, A Sports Myth Grows in Brooklyn, Colum. Journalism Rev. (Mar. 18, 
2011, 1:37 PM), http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/a_sports_myth_grows_in_brooklyn. 
php?page=all (politicians, newspapers, and the developer made claims that the new arena 
was on the exact same site as O’Malley’s desired site for Dodger Stadium, which was incor-
rect); John Manbeck, Stadium Battles Both Past and Present, Brooklyn Paper, Feb. 7, 2004, 
http://www.brooklynpaper.com/stories/27/5/27_05nets6.html. 
5 See Robert M. Jarvis, When the Lawyers Slept: The Unmaking of the Brooklyn Dodgers, 74 
Cornell L. Rev. 347, 352 (1989); Manbeck, supra note 4. 
6 Manbeck, supra note 4. 
7 Jarvis, supra note 5, at 351. 
8 See Manbeck, supra note 4. The Parks Commissioner, Robert Moses, said “Walter hon-
estly believes that he, in himself, constitutes a public purpose” in response to O’Malley’s ar-
guments for a new stadium. Id. 
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with Los Angeles to move the team in exchange for a new stadium built 
using public funds and the city’s condemnation powers.9 
                                                                                                                     
 The political landscape of the city has changed since Brooklyn de-
nied O’Malley a new stadium for the Dodgers in the 1950s.10 In the ear-
ly 2000s, Bruce Ratner, a New York real estate developer, conceived a 
development plan also on the corner of Atlantic and Flatbrush Ave-
nue.11 Private landowners, however, owned a portion of the site and 
buying the land would take years and millions of dollars.12 Therefore, 
instead of negotiating with hundreds of landowners, Ratner bought the 
New Jersey Nets, a historically unsuccessful basketball franchise with an 
owner looking to sell.13 After purchasing the Nets, Ratner used the 
team as leverage for a large real estate project that required Brooklyn 
city officials to use the city’s eminent domain powers to acquire the 
land.14 As part of the development deal, the twenty-two-acre plot of 
land would include a new basketball arena, luxury condominiums, and 
office towers.15 
 In Goldstein v. Pataki, community members living on the con-
demned land challenged the taking in federal court, arguing that the 
taking of their land for a professional basketball stadium did not meet 
the Constitution’s public-use requirement.16 On appeal, in 2008, the 
Second Circuit broadened the public-use analysis by giving deference to 
legislatures while requiring plaintiffs to find no public purpose at all in a 
taking.17 In light of the trend to build multi-purpose areas such as pub-
 
9 See Zack O’Malley Greenburg, Who Framed Walter O’Malley?, Forbes.com (Apr. 14, 2009, 
6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/04/14/brooklyn-dodgers-stadium-lifestyle-sports-base 
ball-stadiums.html. 
10 See Editorial, The Brooklyn Nets, N.Y. Times, July 4, 2004, at CY9 (arguing that city of-
ficials should weigh the stadium proposal using a cost-benefit analysis). 
11 See Malcolm Gladwell, The Nets and NBA Economics, Grantland (Sept. 26, 2011, 12:00 
AM), http://www.grantland.com/story/_/id/7021031/the-nets-nba-economics; Oder, supra 
note 4. 
12 See id. 
13 See id.; Nets Season Records, http://www.nba.com/nets/season_records.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2012). Since the 1985 season, the Nets have failed to qualify for the playoffs 15 
times. Nets Season Records, supra. 
14 See Charles V. Bagli, Atlantic Yards Wins Appeal to Seize Land, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 
2009, at A1; Gladwell, supra note 11 (describing the New Jersey Nets purchase as “eminent 
domain insurance” to acquire the land). 
15 See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2008); Gladwell, supra note 11. 
16 Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 516 F.3d 50 (2d 
Cir. 2008); Brooklyn Property Owners and Tenants to Announce Federal Eminent Domain Lawsuit 
Against Pataki, Ratner, Gargano, Bloomberg and Doctoroff, Develop Don’t Destroy Brook-
lyn, http://www.dddb.net/php/latestnews_Linked.php?id=299 (posted Oct. 25, 2006). 
17 See Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 58, 60. 
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lic stadiums that serve as the venue for sporting events, music concerts, 
and theater performances, the burden of proving that a stadium project 
has no public purpose at all is insurmountable.18 This Note argues that 
among the forty-four states that have passed eminent domain reforms to 
achieve a better balance between public use and private purpose, the 
Massachusetts approach presents a stronger alternative to protect the 
public-use doctrine when a stadium project is at issue.19 Massachusetts, 
which has not passed any significant eminent domain reform, approves 
stadium projects using a series of principles that narrowly define when 
public use is justified.20 In doing so, the Commonwealth struck a bal-
ance not considered by the New York court in Goldstein.21 
 Part I begins by exploring the development of eminent domain 
law and its path to the landmark decision, Kelo v. City of New London.22 It 
then tracks the legislative attempts on the federal and state level to limit 
economic development as a public purpose after the Kelo decision.23 
Part II tracks the evolution of sports stadium public-use analyses and 
provides an in-depth look at the Goldstein decision.24 Part III tracks Mas-
sachusetts’s approach to public use, beginning with its origins and mov-
ing to modern examples.25 Finally, Part IV argues that although sta-
dium projects should not be categorically denied public-use status 
legislatures can better protect the public’s tax dollars by implementing 
stronger enforcement language in its stadium legislation.26 
I. A History of Eminent Domain in the United States 
A. The Road to Kelo 
 Courts consistently have held that the use of the government’s 
power of eminent domain to appropriate private property through 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Ilya Somin, Let There Be Blight: Blight Condemnations in New York After Goldstein 
and Kaur, 38 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1193, 1208–09 (2011) (discussing the difficulties of bring-
ing blight condemnation challenges on public use grounds after the Goldstein decision). 
19 See 50 State Report Card: Tracking Eminent Domain Reform Legislation Since Kelo, Castle 
Coal., http://castlecoalition.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2412&Item 
id=129 (last updated Nov. 9, 2012). 
20 See infra notes 158–170 and accompanying text. 
21 See Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 64–65. 
22 See infra notes 27–79 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 80–99 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 100–153 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 154–194 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 196–261 and accompanying text. 
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condemnation is necessary to the function of a modern state.27 The 
government’s authority to seize property originated in English com-
mon law.28 During the seventeenth century, colonial governments ex-
ercised their eminent domain authority, albeit infrequently.29 Although 
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the government’s condemning au-
thority for proper public purpose is “well-nigh conclusive,” the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides limitations on how and 
when a seizure of land may occur.30 The Fifth Amendment states: “nor 
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion.”31 Thus, in eminent domain challenges, courts generally examine 
whether the government used the seized property for a public-post-
condemnation use and whether it paid appropriate compensation.32 In 
practice, the Fifth Amendment protects a property owner from confer-
ring a benefit on another private party through a government-
mandated transfer of property without a public purpose, even if the 
government paid compensation.33 
 Generally, the courts are the mechanism for enforcing the public-
use requirement, but public officials, on the other hand, actually de-
termine the public use.34 The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that the role for courts in reviewing a legislature’s determination of 
public use is “an extremely narrow” one.35 The Court has reasoned that 
this limited review is proper because legislatures are better suited to 
assess public uses.36 Because of this deferential standard, a court must 
limit its review of a legislature’s public-use determination to whether 
                                                                                                                      
27 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924); 
Rosenthal & Rosenthal, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 771 F.2d 44, 45 (2d Cir. 1985). 
28 2A Julius L. Sackman, Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 7.01[2], at 7-19 (3d ed. 2011) 
(“The principle that private property may be taken for public uses can be traced to early 
English common law which presumed that the king ultimately held the title to all the land.”). 
29 Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain Law: A Rationale Based 
on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 9 (2006). 
30 See U.S. Const. amend. V; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). 
31 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
32 Alberto B. Lopez, Revisiting Kelo and Eminent Domain’s “Summer of Scrutiny,” 59 Ala. 
L. Rev. 561, 566–67 (2008). 
33 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984) (holding that a purely private 
taking could not withstand the scrutiny of the public-use requirement, and thus it would 
serve no legitimate purpose of government and would be void); Thompson v. Consol. Gas 
Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937) (citing cases where takings for private benefit without 
public use are invalid); see Lopez, supra note 32. 
34 See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240; Berman, 348 U.S. at 32; Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 57. 
35 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240; Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. 
36 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244. 
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“the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a 
conceivable public purpose.”37 
 In early U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the Court indicated that 
takings for private parties without public benefits violated the public-
use requirement.38 As technology advanced and corporations began to 
grow increasingly complex, however, governments began using their 
eminent domain powers to assist private firms.39 In 1916, in Mt. Vernon-
Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., the Supreme 
Court expanded the definition of public use by holding that govern-
ment takings appropriate for private parties may not violate the Fifth 
Amendment.40 In Mt. Vernon, the state initiated eminent domain pro-
ceedings to take land, water, and water rights from the plaintiff so a 
power company could create and sell hydroelectric power.41 The Court 
held that even though the taking benefitted a private party, it also had a 
public purpose to “save mankind from toil that it can be spared” and 
acknowledged the limitations of requiring explicit public use for emi-
nent domain takings.42 
 As the Court expanded its definition of public use, it also began 
showing greater deference to legislatures exercising their eminent do-
main powers.43 In 1954, in Berman v. Parker, the Court evaluated the 
constitutionality of a law aimed at eradicating the problems of blight 
and substandard housing in a Washington, D.C. neighborhood.44 The 
Justices unanimously held that “[t]he concept of the public welfare is 
                                                                                                                      
37 Id. at 241. 
38 See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent 
Domain 178 (1985) (“The nineteenth-century view . . . was that it was a perversion of the 
public use doctrine to acquire land by condemnation for [private] purposes.”); see, e.g., 
Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (holding that a government deci-
sion to compel a railroad company to provide land to farmers for a grain elevator at its 
railway station was a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
39 William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants 
Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent Domain, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 929, 933 (2004) (“Thus, 
private developers of reservoirs, canals, railroads, oil and gas pipelines, power dams, and 
telephone and electric-power lines all got the right of eminent domain at one time or an-
other.”). 
40 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916). 
41 Id. at 30–31. 
42 Id. at 32. 
43 See Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925) (holding that 
when “Congress has declared the purpose to be a public use . . . [i]ts decision is entitled to 
deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility”); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 
262 U.S. 700, 709 (1923) (holding that the legislature determines whether appropriating 
private property is for public use); Kelly, supra note 29, at 11. 
44 Berman, 348 U.S. at 28–31. 
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broad and inclusive” and a statute targeting blight did not violate the 
Public-Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment, even if some private land 
would be taken and transferred to private developers.45 Berman af-
firmed the Court’s broad definition of public use and its deference to 
legislative findings.46 
 The Court next heard a challenge against its broad interpretation 
of public use in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.47 In Midkiff, the 
Hawaii Legislature enacted a statute allowing it to acquire fee simple 
titles through eminent domain and transfer those titles to private par-
ties.48 The statute allowed tenants to request eminent domain proceed-
ings on their landlord’s property and permitted these tenants to pur-
chase the property.49 A private landowner whose property the 
government targeted argued that the statute violated the Fifth Amend-
ment.50 The Court affirmed its holding in Berman and held that the 
state’s conveyance to private parties did not necessarily lead to an un-
constitutional taking.51 The Court held that it would “not substitute its 
judgment for a legislature’s judgment as to what constitutes a public 
use ‘unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.’”52 
                                                                                                                     
 Taking guidance from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Berman 
and Midkiff, lower federal courts have held that once a proper public 
use has been established, the taking is constitutional.53 One successful 
 
 
45 See id. at 33, 35–36. 
46 See James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain, 69 
Minn. L. Rev. 1277, 1282 (1985) (“Thus, the Berman Court not only gave an almost unlimited 
meaning to public use, it also drew a very limited role for courts reviewing whether such 
actions were taken in the public welfare.”). 
47 See 467 U.S. at 239–41. 
48 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 516-83 (2011); Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233. The purpose of the act 
was to correct Hawaii’s land oligopoly, which “created artificial deterrents to the normal 
functioning of the State’s residential land market and forced thousands of individual 
homeowners to lease, rather than buy, the land underneath their homes.” Midkiff, 467 U.S. 
at 241–42. 
49 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 516-22; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 233. 
50 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 234–35. 
51 See id. at 244; Berman, 348 U.S. at 35–36 (holding that once public purpose has been 
decided, government agencies, rather than courts, have the power determine the scope of 
a taking). Specifically, the Court rejected any “literal requirement” that condemned prop-
erty needed to be used for the general public. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244. 
52 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241. 
53 See, e.g., United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land, 547 F.3d 943, 949, 952 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(citing Berman in holding that a project that was the partnership between private and pub-
lic entities satisfied public use for a taking); Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban 
Dev. Corp., 771 F.2d 44, 45 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Berman and Midkiff in holding that rede-
velopment of a blighted area satisfied the public use requirement); Ledford v. Corps of 
460 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 40:453 
challenge in federal court, however, has been to use circumstantial evi-
dence to find pretext in an eminent domain condemnation.54 In 99 
Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, a California federal 
district court held that a city’s eminent domain plan failed a rational 
public purpose test.55 The plaintiff, who owned a discount general 
goods store, established his store next to a large national retail chain 
that threatened to relocate to a neighboring area if the city did not ap-
prove an eminent domain condemnation of the plaintiff’s land.56 The 
court held that the defendant’s public purpose justification, which was 
to prevent the “reestablishment of blight,” did not satisfy the public use 
requirement.57 In its decision, the court also noted that pretext played 
a role in its analysis, as “the very reason that [the defendant] decided to 
condemn [plaintiff’s] leasehold interest was to appease [the retail 
chain]. Such conduct amounts to an unconstitutional taking for purely 
private purposes.”58 
B. Kelo: Private Benefit and the Pretextual Purpose 
 In 2005, the Court expanded its public-use analysis to allow gov-
ernment takings that have the potential to benefit the community at 
large, even if the takings also directly benefit private interests.59 In Kelo 
                                                                                                                      
Eng’rs, 500 F.2d 26, 28 (6th Cir. 1974) (citing Berman in holding that plaintiff’s concession 
of a project’s public purpose satisfied the public use requirement). 
54 See 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redev. Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1126–27, 
1128, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2001). In 99 Cents, the court described pretext: 
If officials could take private property, even with adequate compensation, 
simply by deciding behind closed doors that some other use of the property 
would be a “public use,” and if those officials could later justify their decisions 
in court merely by positing “a conceivable public purpose” to which the tak-
ing is rationally related, the “public use” provision of the Takings Clause 
would lose all power to restrain government takings. 
Id. at 1129 (quoting Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1321 (9th Cir. 1996)). The U.S. 
Supreme Court has provided little guidance to lower courts on how to determine whether 
pretext exists in a taking. See Daniel B. Kelly, Pretextual Takings: Of Private Developers, Local 
Governments, and Impermissible Favoritism, 17 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 173, 174 (2009). 
55 See 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1130–31 (holding that “future blight” is not a rational public 
purpose). 
56 Id. at 1125–27. In the agreement, the city agreed to sell the land to the retail chain 
for a nominal fee of one dollar. Id. at 1126. 
57 Id. at 1129–30. 
58 See id. at 1129; Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 934, 968 (2003). The court noted that the city’s condemnation plan 
was “nothing more than the desire to achieve the naked transfer of property from one 
private party to another.” 99 Cents Only Stores, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1129. 
59 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 489–90 (2005). 
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v. City of New London, the Court rejected a challenge to a city’s eminent 
domain proposal to transfer condemned land to a private development 
corporation.60 According to the city, the purpose of the project was to 
promote economic renewal by transforming seven privately owned, 
non-blighted parcels of land.61 In its decision, the Court recounted the 
historically narrow interpretation of public use from the nineteenth 
century courts, where the public had to directly benefit from the ac-
quired property.62 After chronicling the historical roots of eminent 
domain, the Court recognized that Berman and Midkiff “repeatedly and 
consistently rejected” interpreting public use so narrowly.63 Accord-
ingly, the Court adopted a “more natural interpretation of public use” 
and held that even though the takings benefitted a private interest, the 
city’s condemnation “unquestionably serves a public purpose” and sat-
isfied the Fifth Amendment.64 
 Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the narrow 5-to-4 majority, 
relied on Berman and Midkiff to base the decision in part on a “policy of 
deference to legislative judgments.”65 Using reasoning from Midkiff, the 
majority opinion emphasized that the taking’s purpose, rather than its 
“mechanics” is what “matters in determining public use.”66 The Court 
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that transferring property to private 
developers required a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny or that the 
city needed to provide evidence that the takings would achieve the 
economic benefits that justified the public use.67 
 The Supreme Court also—for the first time—expressly recognized 
pretext challenges to eminent domain actions.68 The Court opined, 
“the City [would not] be allowed to take property under the mere pre-
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. at 473–75, 489. 
61 Id. at 474–75. 
62 See id. at 479 (noting that the narrow view “steadily eroded over time” and was “diffi-
cult to administer . . . given the diverse and always evolving needs of society”). 
63 See id. at 480–82; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241–42, 244; Berman, 348 U.S. at 34–35; see also 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014–15 (1984) (“This Court, however, has 
rejected the notion that a use is a public use only if the property taken is put to use for the 
general public.”). 
64 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480, 484. 
65 Id. at 480–82; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241–42, 244; Berman, 348 U.S. at 34–35. The majority 
emphasized that courts should not “second-guess the City’s considered judgments about the 
efficacy of [the] development plan.” Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488. 
66 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 482; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244. 
67 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 486–87. 
68 Id. at 478; Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 60 (“Kelo opened up [an] avenue for a takings chal-
lenge under which a plaintiff could claim a taking had been effectuated under the mere 
pretext of a public purpose, when [the] actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.” 
(second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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text of a public purpose, when its actual purpose was to bestow a private 
benefit.”69 After the Court examined the motive of the city in Kelo, it 
determined that the city did not adopt the development plan to benefit 
particular individuals, but rather, to benefit the public with job crea-
tion, increased tax revenue, and new commercial, residential, and rec-
reational buildings.70 Because Justice Stevens determined there was no 
pretext in the case, the Court did not further explore the issue.71 
 Justice Anthony Kennedy in his concurring opinion elaborated on 
pretext claims, asserting that courts analyzing the Public-Use Clause 
should strike down takings that clearly show favorable benefits to a pri-
vate party with only incidental public benefits.72 Justice Kennedy quoted 
the trial court, agreeing that when the purpose of a taking is economic 
development to benefit private parties, the reviewing court should de-
termine whether the stated public purposes are “incidental to the bene-
fits that will be confined on private parties.”73 Because the Court found 
no pretext in Kelo, Justice Kennedy anticipated future cases may further 
define the pretext standard.74 
 In dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor criticized the majority for 
making private property vulnerable under the “banner of economic 
development.”75 The dissent argued that in Midkiff and Berman, public 
use was justified because the government’s eminent domain actions 
remedied an “affirmative harm on society.”76 Unlike the Court’s prece-
dents, in Kelo, the majority’s rationale of economic development was 
incidental to the condemnation of land for private parties.77 Justice 
O’Connor argued that the economic development rationale is prob-
lematic because the private benefit and incidental public benefit are 
“merged and mutually reinforcing,” meaning that it would be nearly 
                                                                                                                      
69 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478. 
70 Id. at 483. 
71 Id. at 478. 
72 Id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 493. Justice Kennedy described pretext as “undetected impermissible favoritism.” 
Id. 
75 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
76 Id. at 500; see Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232; Berman, 348 U.S. at 30. 
77 Compare Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (finding that eminent do-
main transfer of land to a private party satisfies public use if it results in secondary benefit 
for the public), with Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232, 245 (upholding condemnation scheme redis-
tributing title when 22 landowners owned 72.5 percent of all fee simple titles in Oahu), 
and Berman, 348 U.S. at 30, 36 (upholding condemnation to repair blight when 64.3 per-
cent of the dwellings were beyond repair). 
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impossible to isolate pretext from incidental public benefits.78 Justice 
Clarence Thomas went even further in his dissent, urging the Court to 
move back to a narrow reading of the Public-Use Clause that only ap-
plies when if a taking directly benefits the public.79 
C. The Federal and State Response to Kelo 
 Both federal and state governments reacted immediately to the 
Kelo decision by proposing and passing legislation designed to limit its 
reach. Although federal legislative attempts have proven difficult to get 
through Congress, an overwhelming number of states have passed leg-
islation clarifying and amending their eminent domain laws. 
1. Federal Legislative Response 
 Quick on the heels of the Kelo decision, the U.S. Congress pro-
posed legislation to limit the government’s eminent domain powers.80 
Just one day after the Kelo decision, the House of Representatives 
passed a resolution by a vote of 365 to 33, expressing “grave disap-
proval” of the Supreme Court in Kelo for nullifying the “protections af-
forded private property owners.”81 
 Congressional disapproval of the Kelo decision led to several at-
tempts to limit its impact. For instance, Representative Robert B. Ader-
holt proposed an amendment to the Constitution preventing the fed-
eral government or any state government from taking property and 
transferring it to a private party “except for a public conveyance or 
transportation project.”82 In the Senate, just four days after the Kelo de-
cision, Senator John Cornyn introduced The Protection of Homes, 
Small Businesses, and Private Property Act of 2005.83 The bill cited the 
Supreme Court’s Kelo decision and responded by stating that eminent 
                                                                                                                      
78 Kelo, 545 U.S. at 502. 
79 Id. at 508 (Thomas, J., dissenting). “[T]he government may take property only if it 
actually uses or gives the public a legal right to use the property.” Id. at 521. 
80 See Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 Minn. 
L. Rev. 2100, 2149–54 (2009); Mike Allen & Charles Babington, House Votes to Undercut 
High Court on Property, Wash. Post, July 1, 2005, at A1. 
81 H.R. Res. 340, 109th Cong. (2005). 
82 H.R.J. Res. 60, 109th Cong. (2005); see also H.R. 2980, 109th Cong. (2005) (propos-
ing an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code allowing condemned landowners from 
paying taxes on the money they receive in excess of the value of the property). 
83 S. 1313, 109th Cong. § 1 (2005). During his floor statement, Senator Cornyn de-
scribed the Kelo decision as “alarming” and “a disappointment.” 152 Cong. Rec. 12,492–93 
(2006) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn). 
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domain could only be used “for public use.”84 In a rebuke to the Kelo 
court, the bill defined public use to exclude “economic development” 
and applied the law to federal, state, and local government condemna-
tions.85 
 Although Senator Cornyn’s bill halted in the judiciary commit-
tee,86 on October 19, 2005, Congress amended a Transportation, 
Treasury, Housing and Urban Development Appropriations bill to in-
clude a section resembling Senator Cornyn’s bill.87 The amendment 
barred federal transportation funds in projects that used eminent do-
main for “economic development that primarily benefits private enti-
ties.”88 On November 30, 2005, President George W. Bush signed the 
amended bill into law.89 
2. The State Legislative Response 
 Kelo set the minimum constitutional requirement for eminent do-
main takings, but states could impose greater restrictions.90 The major-
ity in Kelo wrote, “[n]othing in our opinion precludes any State from 
placing further restrictions on its exercise of the takings power.”91 At 
least forty-four states have done just that, passing legislation to limit the 
decision’s expansion of public use.92 For example, after Kelo, the Flor-
                                                                                                                      
 
84 S. 1313 § 2(6). 
85 Id. § 3(b)–(c). 
86 See Bill Summary & Status: 109th Congress (2005–2006) S. 1313, Library of Congress: 
Thomas, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d109:1313:./list/bss/d109SN.lst:@@@ X 
(last visited May 18, 2013). 
87 S. Amdt. 2113, 109th Cong. (2005); 151 Cong. Rec. 23,154–55 (2005)(statement of 
Sen. Christopher S. Bond) (“No funds in this Act may be used to support any federal, 
state, or local projects that seek to use the power of eminent domain, unless eminent do-
main is employed only for a public use . . . .”). 
88 S. Amdt. 2113, 109th Cong. (2005); 151 Cong. Rec. 23,154–55 (2005) (statement of 
Sen. Christopher S. Bond). On November 3, 2005, the House also passed the Private Prop-
erty Rights Protection Act of 2005, which defined “economic development” as taking private 
property and conveying the property “to another private person or entity for commercial 
enterprise carried on for profit.” H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill was received in the 
Senate and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, but never reached a vote. See Bill 
Summary & Status: 109th Congress (2005–2006) H.R. 4128, Library of Congress: Thomas, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR04128:@@@C (last visited May 18, 2013). 
89 Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, the Judiciary, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. 
L. No. 109-115, § 726, 119 Stat. 2396, 2494–95 (2005). 
90 545 U.S. at 489–90. 
91 Id. at 489. 
92 See Marc Mihaly & Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and Federal Legislative 
and Judicial Activity Five Years Later, 38 Ecology L.Q. 703, 707 (2011) (noting that public 
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ida legislature commissioned a study on eminent domain, and then 
passed a statute narrowly defining public use.93 The Florida law allows 
transferring land to private parties through eminent domain only when 
the purpose is for common carriers, roads, transportation services, 
electricity systems, and public infrastructure.94 One commentator de-
scribed Florida’s reform as one of the most stringent sets of eminent 
domain restrictions that narrowed the definition of public use beyond 
even Berman and Midkiff.95 
 In Texas, the legislature limited the ability of the government to 
seize land for a private benefit, but it included “community develop-
ment” and “urban renewal” exceptions.96 In 2006, California’s gover-
nor signed five eminent domain bills passed by the legislature,97 but the 
laws faced significant criticism for lacking teeth.98 According to one 
organization focused on stronger eminent domain protections, twenty-
nine states received a “passing” grade for enacting strong eminent re-
forms since Kelo, while twenty-one states “failed.”99 
                                                                                                                      
outcry resulted in federal and state legislative efforts to “curtail the power of eminent do-
main”); 50 State Report Card, supra note 19. 
93 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 73.013 (West 2012); see Mihaly & Smith, supra note 92, at 709. 
94 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 73.013(1)(a)–(e). 
95 See Lopez, supra note 32, at 591. 
96 Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 2206.001(b)(3) (West 2011). 
97 S.B. 53, 2005–06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (requiring redevelopment plans to con-
tain significant findings of blight before eminent domain actions); S.B. 1206, 2005–06 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (revising the conditions characterizing a blighted area); S.B. 1210, 
2005–06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (revising the notice and time requirements for an emi-
nent domain action); S.B. 1650, 2005–06 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006) (requiring public use to 
be determined by a two-thirds majority in the state congress); S.B. 1809, 2005–06 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Cal. 2006) (requiring government agency to provide a statement within sixty days de-
scribing the provisions of a plan that authorizes eminent domain). 
98See California, Castle Coal., http://castlecoalition.org/about/1330 (last visited May 
21, 2013). The bills “create a few additional procedural hoops for condemning authorities 
to jump through, such as requiring more details about the proposed use of the targeted 
property and additional findings of blight” but they are “mostly cosmetic and will not pre-
vent determined officials from taking private property for another private party’s benefit.” 
Id. 
99 See 50 State Report Card, supra note 19. Six states have not passed any eminent do-
main legislation at all. Id. These states are Arkansas, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New Jersey, 
New York, and Oklahoma. Id. 
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II. Public Use in the Realm of Sports Stadiums 
 Prior to World War II, sports teams generally built their stadiums 
with their own private funds.100 Since 1958, however, when the Brooklyn 
Dodgers moved to Los Angeles, most new stadiums have been financed 
using municipal bonds traditionally used to finance roads, schools, and 
other public endeavors.101 Generally courts have had minimal involve-
ment in hearing challenges to takings for privately owned sports stadi-
ums.102 In cases where citizens have challenged stadium projects, how-
ever, the projects have generally withstood the challenges.103 
A. Public Use Challenges to Sports Stadiums 
1. Establishing Public Purpose to Build Dodger Stadium 
 For more than forty years, the Brooklyn Dodgers played in Ebbets 
Field, a stadium privately financed in 1911 for $750,000.104 By 1955, 
however, the team’s owner, Walter O’Malley, believed the stadium was 
outdated and began searching for a new home for his baseball team.105 
He wrote a letter to Robert Moses, New York City’s Parks Commis-
sioner, requesting that the city condemn specific parcels of land at the 
corner of Atlantic and Flatbrush Avenues under the Housing Act of 
1949, which encouraged local governments to address urban blight.106 
In addition to a new baseball stadium, O’Malley proposed transforming 
the surrounding area, including constructing a new meat market and 
                                                                                                                      
100 See Zachary A. Phelps, Note, Stadium Construction for Professional Sports: Reversing the 
Inequities Through Tax Incentives, 18 St. John’s J. Legal Comment 981, 982–83 (2004). Be-
fore 1948, only four major stadiums were built with any public assistance. Id. 
101 Philip Weinberg, Eminent Domain for Private Sports Stadiums: Fair Ball or Foul?, 35 En-
vtl. L. 311, 314–15 (2005). Weinberg notes that private entities funded Yankee Stadium, 
Fenway Park, Comiskey Park, and Wrigley Field. Id. at 314. 
102 Id. at 320 (noting that “surprisingly scant precedent exists regarding government 
acquisition of property for privately owned sports stadiums”). 
103 Id. at 316–18. 
104 See Jarvis, supra note 5, at 350. Forty different owners held title to the parcel of land 
for the stadium. Id. To keep the prices low, Ebbets formed a dummy corporation and kept 
the news of what he was doing away from the public and the press. Id. 
105 See id.; Manbeck, supra note 4. 
106 See Jarvis, supra note 5, at 352 & n.31 (noting that the purpose of the law was to “stim-
ulate residential housing construction in order to alleviate the post-war shortage of afford-
able housing for lower and middle-income families”); Letter from Walter O’Malley, Presi-
dent, Brooklyn National League Baseball Club, to Robert Moses, City Construction Co-
ordinator, City of New York (Aug. 10, 1955), available at http://www.walteromalley.com/ 
images/docu/08_10_1955_wfom.pdf. 
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railroad station.107 Moses rejected O’Malley’s proposal, writing: “I can 
only repeat what we have told you verbally and in writing, namely, that a 
new ball field for the Dodgers cannot be dressed up as [an eminent 
domain] project.”108 
 Los Angeles was of a different opinion than New York, and it en-
tered into a contract with the team, promising to obtain land for a sta-
dium if the Dodgers relocated to the West Coast.109 The city promised 
to convey 185 acres of land it already owned in the Chavez Ravine and 
use its “best efforts” to acquire 300 total acres.110 Instead of analyzing 
the city’s plan using eminent domain law, however, the Supreme Court 
of California considered whether the contract made by the city had a 
proper public purpose.111 The court held the expenditure of public 
funds was for a valid public purpose “even though the city [was] in ef-
fect agreeing to purchase land for the purpose of selling it immediately 
thereafter to a private corporation.”112 The state court reasoned that 
the city could not purchase land when it had no public use or purpose, 
but in this case, “furnishing the type of contract consideration which 
enables the city to enter into a bargain which it deems advantageous” 
was a legitimate public purpose.113 
2. Expanding the Public Use Doctrine 
 After the Supreme Court of California established that stadiums 
could have a public purpose in a government-spending context, courts 
began accepting an increasing number of rationales for why sports sta-
diums further public purposes.114 In Martin v. City of Philadelphia, in 
1966, a plaintiff sued to stop city officials from implementing an ordi-
                                                                                                                      
107 See Jarvis, supra note 5, at 352. 
108 Id.; Letter from Robert Moses, City Construction Coordinator, City of New York, to 
Walter O’Malley, President, Brooklyn National League Baseball Club (Aug. 15, 1955), 
available at http://www.walteromalley.com/images/docu/08_15_1955_moses.pdf. 
109 City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court of L.A., 333 P.2d 745, 747 (Cal. 1959). 
110 Id. at 749. The court held that “best efforts” meant that the city could spend up to 
two million dollars to acquire land for the stadium. Id. 
111 Id. at 751–52. The court noted that eminent domain law was unnecessary because 
the city government was not acquiring property for the purpose of giving it to private par-
ties. Id. Instead, the city was purchasing property “as part of the consideration of a contract 
entered into for a legitimate public purpose.” Id. at 752. 
112 Id. at 751–53. 
113 Id. In 1960, San Francisco used thirty-two million dollars in public funds to finance 
Candlestick Park and lure the New York Giants baseball team to the city. See Phelps, supra 
note 100, at 986. 
114 See Martin v. City of Philadelphia, 215 A.2d 894, 898–99 (Penn. 1966); City of Ana-
heim v. Michel, 259 Cal. App. 2d 835, 836, 838–39 (1968). 
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nance authorizing a twenty-five million dollar loan to build a sports sta-
dium.115 The plaintiff argued that the city ordinance unlawfully author-
ized increasing the city’s debt for private use.116 The court ruled for the 
city, however, holding that the law did not limit public purposes to tra-
ditional municipal projects.117 Instead, the court held that public pur-
pose also included “anything calculated to promote the education, the 
recreation or the pleasure of the public.”118 The court also noted that 
even if the public funds financed a stadium used primarily by privately 
held professional teams, it was still public use because the city was “pro-
viding for ‘the recreation or the pleasure of the public.’”119 
 In 1968, in City of Anaheim v. Michel, the city attempted to use its 
eminent domain powers to condemn the land surrounding Anaheim 
Stadium to create a public parking lot for the ballpark.120 The court 
held that this was a valid taking because public parking associated with 
a sports stadium could lessen congestion and reduce accidents, thus 
satisfying the public use requirement.121 The court also noted with ap-
proval the trial court’s conclusion that the stadium and surrounding 
parking constituted a proper public use.122 
 In the 1990s, the City of Arlington entered into an agreement with 
the Texas Rangers baseball franchise to create the Arlington Sports Fa-
cilities Development Authority.123 The Arlington City Council con-
demned land around the stadium for a parking facility and transferred 
it to the Rangers.124 The team received all privileges and rights to the 
revenue generated by the property in exchange for a nominal one dol-
lar per year payment to the city.125 In City of Arlington, Texas v. Golddust 
                                                                                                                      
 
115 215 A.2d at 895. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 896. 
118 Id. (internal quotation omitted) (citing examples of public purposes, including gar-
dens, parks, monuments, fountains, libraries, and museums). 
119 Id. 
120 Michel, 259 Cal. App. 2d at 836. 
121 Id. at 839. 
122 Id. The lower court noted that that the stadium and surrounding parking area con-
stituted a proper public use, but held that the city did not have statutory authority to bring 
condemnation actions. Id. at 837. 
123 City of Arlington, Tex. v. Golddust Twins Realty Corp., 41 F.3d 960, 962 (5th Cir. 
1994). 
124 See id. 
125 Id. The mayor of Arlington, when asked whether the stadium was a public use, said, 
“[t]here was a public benefit to building the ballpark project. The land needed to support the 
project had to be acquired for the project. . . . There’s a mutual benefit in this project, and it’s 
well accepted and well established in law that this project was eligible for that public purpose.” 
2013] Public Use Limits in Stadium Eminent Domain Takings 469 
Twins Realty Corp., the landowner argued that the taking did not satisfy 
a valid public use because the city was not honest in stating its pur-
pose.126 The district court agreed and found for the landowner, but the 
Fifth Circuit reversed.127 The Fifth Circuit upheld the taking, reason-
ing: (1) deference must be given when the Texas Legislature deter-
mined the construction a public use;128 (2) when the government con-
demns the entire interest in land, the taking is valid as long as there is a 
public purpose;129 and (3) multi-use stadiums utilized for more than 
just sporting events still further a public purpose.130 
                                                                                                                     
B. How Atlantic Yards Broadened the Public-Use Analysis 
 In December 2003, Bruce Ratner, a major real-estate developer, 
announced the Atlantic Yards Arena and Redevelopment Project (“At-
lantic Yards Project”), a publicly subsidized development project that 
covered twenty-two acres around the heart of downtown Brooklyn, New 
York.131 The proposed project’s footprint contained two major portions: 
roughly half within the Atlantic Terminal Urban Renewal Area and the 
other half consisted of an adjacent parcel of land occupied by an as-
sortment of privately owned housing.132 The site was considered one of 
the best undeveloped tracts of real estate in the Northeast, as most of 
Manhattan was no more than a twenty--minute train ride away.133 
 Because private individuals and entities owned half of the pro-
posed site for the Atlantic Yards Project, it would have cost millions of 
dollars and required many years to buy the land from each individual 
owner.134 Due at least in part to the high costs of obtaining the land, in 
2004, Ratner purchased the New Jersey Nets basketball franchise for 
three hundred million dollars.135 Ratner used the team as leverage for 
 
Robert Bryce, What Price Baseball?, Austin Chron. ( June 20, 1997), http://www.austinchroni- 
cle.com/news/1997-06-20/529131/. 
126 Golddust Twins, 41 F.3d at 963. In the lower court, Arlington, in its statement of 
purpose, said that the taking was for use of the property as a parking facility. Id. 
127 See id. at 966. 
128 Id. at 963. 
129 See id. at 965. Specifically, the court noted that “a court’s invalidation of a condem-
nation on the grounds that land condemned for one purpose may not be used for another 
is only proper when the situation specifically requires an accurate statement of purpose.” 
Id. 
130 See id. at 966. 
131 Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2008). 
132 Id.; see Gladwell, supra note 11. 
133 See Gladwell, supra note 11. 
134 See id. 
135 Bagli, supra note 14. 
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the Atlantic Yards Project by offering Brooklyn officials a development 
complex that included the basketball team; an arena with architecture 
plans designed by architect Frank Gehry; affordable housing for teach-
ers, firefighters, and construction workers; and a larger and better rail 
yard.136 Supporters of the project claimed that Atlantic Yards would 
generate thousands of new jobs, hundreds of millions in new tax reve-
nue, and new units of subsidized housing.137 With these justifications, 
the Borough of Brooklyn began procedures to acquire the site through 
the state’s eminent domain powers.138 
 Fifteen property owners in the takings area filed an action on Oc-
tober 2006 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
challenging the city’s use of eminent domain.139 The plaintiffs raised 
three federal-law claims, asserting that the use of eminent domain in the 
Atlantic Yards Project would violate the Public-Use Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.140 From the project’s inception, the plaintiffs 
primarily argued that the Atlantic Yards Project was not driven by a “le-
gitimate concern for the public benefit.”141 Additionally, the plaintiffs 
argued, various government actions were at least partially motivated to 
benefit Ratner, who initially proposed the project and was the primary 
developer.142 In short, the plaintiffs argued that the public purpose ra-
tionales for the project were pretexts for a private taking in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment.143 
 The district court concluded the proposed land condemnation did 
not violate the Public-Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment.144 The At-
lantic Yards Project would serve well-established public uses including 
the construction of a sporting arena, redress of blight, and creation of 
affordable housing.145 The court also disagreed with the plaintiffs’ pre-
text claim.146 It used reasoning from Kelo and held that even if the 
plaintiffs could prove every pretext allegation, a reasonable jury could 
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137 Anahad O’Connor, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit Seeking to Block Atlantic Yards, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 12, 2008, at B2. 
138 See Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 53. 
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still conclude that the public purposes offered by the city in support of 
the project were valid.147 The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ Four-
teenth Amendment claims, holding that there was a rational basis for 
New York’s Eminent Domain Procedure Law to sufficiently satisfy the 
requirements of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.148 
 The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the federal claims 
with prejudice.149 Specifically, the appeals court noted that the plain-
tiffs foreclosed any chance of stopping the taking when they argued 
that the costs involved in the Atlantic Yards Project—as measured by 
the government spending and impact on the neighborhood—would 
dwarf the benefits of the project.150 One of the plaintiff’s central argu-
ments, the court took it to mean that the plaintiff willingly conceded 
that there was some public benefit to be found in the project.151 When 
the plaintiffs acknowledged that the project bore a rational relationship 
to several established categories of public uses, the court drew a con-
trast with claims where the asserted purpose is not legitimate or ra-
tional.152 The court drew from Berman and Kelo and held that such a 
concession was a complete defense to a public-use challenge.153 
                                                                                                                     
III. A Public-Use Alternative: The Massachusetts  
Approach to Stadiums 
 Federal and many state courts afford legislatures considerable def-
erence for public use when using state eminent domain powers.154 Mas-
sachusetts courts, however, are skeptical about a legislature’s rationale 
for a project’s valid public use when it involves stadium projects.155 This 
is in part because of the Massachusetts courts’ insistence on the tradi-
 
147 See Kelo v. City of New London, 645 U.S. 469, 478 (2005); Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d 
at 288. 
148 Goldstein, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 257–59, 291. 
149 Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 65. 
150 See id. at 58. 
151 Id. at 58–59. 
152See id. at 62. The public purposes the plaintiffs conceded included the redress of 
blight, the creation of affordable housing, a public open space, and various mass-transit 
improvements. See id. at 64. 
153 Id. at 58–60; see Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483–84; Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35–36 
(1954). 
154 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 
26, 32 (1954); Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, Note, Can Government Buy Everything?: The Takings 
Clause and the Erosion of the “Public Use” Requirement, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 543, 550 (2002) 
(“[T]he Court established that the legislature’s definition of public use deserves judicial 
deference.”). 
155 See Opinion of the Justices, 250 N.E.2d 547, 558 (Mass. 1969). 
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tional analysis of public use to justify stadium projects.156 As a result, the 
Massachusetts legislature writes stadium legislation to narrowly tailor 
public funding to finance only aspects of a project that serve a tradi-
tional public purpose.157 
A. Developing the Massachusetts Doctrine for Public Use 
 In the 1969 Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court questioned a proposed House 
bill that provided for the “construction, maintenance, repair and op-
eration . . . of certain public facilities consisting of a stadium complex.” 
in Boston.158 The court opined that a large multi-purpose stadium or 
arena may be for a public purpose, but it “is not as clearly and directly a 
public purpose as supplying housing, slum clearance, mass transporta-
tion, highways and vehicular tunnels, educational facilities and other 
necessities.”159 The court advised that the proposed legislation in this 
case did not sufficiently protect the public interest.160 Despite not find-
ing a public purpose, the justices also wrote that a public purpose could 
be found if the legislation included specific standards governing the 
use, rental, and operation of the stadium.161 With the opinion, the jus-
tices indicated that legislation without safeguards protecting the project 
from private interests would not be a valid public use.162 
 Massachusetts legislators similarly view stadium projects with skepti-
cism.163 Thomas Finneran, Speaker of the Massachusetts House of Rep-
resentatives from 1996 to 2004, told the state legislature that the “psy-
chological value” of a sports team to the community is overstated and 
“are the ego-driven bunk of billionaires and their acolytes.”164 On June 
15, 1999, Finneran testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee 
about the state’s negotiations with the New England Patriots for a new 
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stadium.165 In language remarkably similar to the 1969 Opinion of the 
Justices, he explained that public policy in Massachusetts focused primar-
ily on “universally important” goals such as education, infrastructure, 
health care, and housing.166 He further explained that future stadiums 
for Massachusetts franchises would be guided by a series of principles 
preventing taxpayer funds from use for private purposes.167 
 Finneran testified that in considering stadium projects, Massachu-
setts would not (1) fund construction of the stadium facility; (2) fund 
the team franchise; (3) purchase and lease back land for the benefit of 
the franchise; (4) act as a low-cost or no-cost bank for a private, for-
profit business; or (5) recognize or embrace “economic multiplier 
models” that justify public subsidies.168 Furthermore, public funds 
would be used “solely and exclusively for infrastructure,” which in-
cluded on-and-off-ramps, pedestrian walkways, utilities, sewage lines, 
public access, and public health purposes.169 Perhaps most importantly, 
any infrastructure expenditure that primarily benefitted a private inter-
est would be taxed to pay back the state for what it spent.170 
B. Statutory Construction in Massachusetts Stadium Legislation 
 Although there is no general law in Massachusetts restricting fund-
ing for stadiums, when the need arises, the legislature passes statutes 
clearly limiting how public funds can be used.171 In two statutes involv-
ing stadiums for the Boston Red Sox and New England Patriots, Massa-
chusetts allowed public funds only for infrastructure and utility im-
provements.172 The language in the laws was also transparent and gave 
taxpayers a chance to see exactly how the government planned to 
spend their money.173 For example, in legislation for a new stadium for 
the New England Patriots, the legislature described “infrastructure im-
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provements” in minute detail, such as “sidewalks and curbing . . . in the 
town of Walpole along the west side of state highway route 1 to provide 
for the public safety of persons walking to the stadium from parking 
lots located in Walpole.”174 The language of the statutes also ensured 
that teams do not simply get a blank check, as there are caps for the 
money that can be spent, with the developer responsible for budget 
overruns.175 
 Furthermore, the state requires provisions in its legislation that 
allow the state and local governments to receive a return on their in-
vestments.176 The Foxboro Stadium Act allows the state to recover its 
financing costs by collecting $1.15 million in parking fees and $250,000 
in administrative fees per year.177 The state also protects taxpayers from 
teams who threaten to leave the state by requiring at least some reim-
bursement of infrastructure costs if the team leaves the site.178 In the 
Fenway Park Act, the legislature included a clause requiring the team to 
pay up to $12.1 million per year for the lease, a cost that could be re-
duced by paying a percentage of revenue earned by the team.179 
 As a result, stadium bills drafted by the Massachusetts legislature 
are carefully constructed to protect public use.180 In the Foxboro Sta-
dium Act, which was enacted when the New England Patriots began 
looking for a location to build a new stadium, the legislature explicitly 
detailed how and where the state money could be spent for govern-
ment takings and infrastructure development.181 The legislators de-
termined that building the stadium would increase economic devel-
opment and general welfare by providing entertainment and tourism 
revenue, and thus the project constituted a valid public use.182 
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 Plaintiffs who owned and operated eighteen parking lots around 
the takings area challenged the Foxboro Stadium Act.183 The legislation 
created a “parking and traffic management zone” that required licensed 
parking operators to pay an annual aggregate amount of four hundred 
thousand dollars.184 Among their claims, the plaintiffs argued that the 
Foxboro Stadium Act served “no discernible public purpose” and was 
written only to benefit a single private party.185 The Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court affirmed the valid public purpose of the stadium 
by citing the statute’s language, saying “[t]here is nothing in the record, 
or in the text of the Act, that would suggest that such legitimate public 
purposes are outweighed by any benefits conferred on a private par-
ty.”186 
 When a stadium statute does not adequately promote public use, 
Massachusetts courts will strike down the legislation.187 In 2000, a Mas-
sachusetts trial court heard a public stadium case in City of Springfield v. 
Dreison Investments, Inc.188 In Dreison, the Massachusetts Superior Court 
held that the city could not use its eminent domain power to seize land 
for the construction of a minor league baseball stadium.189 The city 
proposed the stadium as part of an urban renewal development project 
and intended to lease the stadium to the baseball team without charg-
ing any rent and collecting only one hundred thousand dollars per year 
in fees.190 The city argued that courts in other states had found that 
similar lease agreements191 served a valid public purpose, and the sta-
dium would provide recreation and economic development.192 The 
court rejected the state’s economic development argument, despite the 
fact that other states adopted such an approach.193 Instead, the court 
held the taking was invalid because the private use of the stadium su-
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perseded its public use, citing the 1969 Opinion of the Justices as prece-
dent.194 Thus, both the Massachusetts legislature and courts have lim-
ited the use of public funds and eminent domain to traditional public 
uses while simultaneously protecting taxpayer funds.195 
IV. Drafting Careful Legislation for Stadium Projects 
Protects the Public from Improper Private Takings 
 One of the most troublesome aspects of sports stadiums is that 
they are similar to projects not traditionally considered proper objects 
of eminent domain, such as hotels, movie theaters, and theme parks.196 
As some commentators have noted, it is difficult to distinguish between 
stadiums and other privately owned entertainment venues.197 These 
commentators highlight the irony that stadiums, which are accessible 
only by paying customers, are considered more “public” than shopping 
centers, even though shopping malls are accessible without charge.198 
As a result, some states have established bright-line tests delineating 
acceptable and unacceptable uses of eminent domain.199 The problem, 
however, is that the explicit denial or allowance of specific uses of emi-
nent domain jeopardizes mixed-use developments, including ones that 
may serve legitimate public purpose.200 The best solution to this prob-
lem is an approach that permits public funding and eminent domain 
actions in stadium projects, but only for aspects that satisfy a traditional 
public-use analysis. 
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A. The Problems with Public-Use Analysis After Kelo 
1. Public Use as a Complete Defense Against Pretext Claims Could 
Make Challenges Against Stadium Projects Impossible To Win 
 The Second Circuit in Goldstein v. Pataki affirmed “well-established” 
categories of public use, but its interpretation makes it particularly dif-
ficult for plaintiffs to win challenges against stadium development.201 
The court explained that any legislative finding where a potential pro-
ject fixes blight, creates affordable housing or a public open space, or 
improves mass transportation, is a complete defense to a public-use 
challenge.202 Furthermore, as long as a taking is “rationally related to a 
classic public use,” the court held disproportionate benefits to a private 
party would not make the taking unconstitutional.203 Here, because the 
plaintiff willingly conceded that there was some public benefit in the 
Atlantic Yards Arena and Redevelopment Project, the redevelopment 
of any blighted area had a valid public purpose.204 
 The Goldstein decision illustrates the problem Justice O’Connor 
identified in her dissent in Kelo: when an economic development ra-
tionale and pretext are indistinguishable.205 Although the Second Cir-
cuit was correct in deferring to legislative findings, in the context of 
large, multi-use projects such as sports stadiums, there are virtually no 
public-use limitations.206 Using the Goldstein court’s reasoning, in states 
that do not have laws preventing private-to-private transfers, state gov-
ernments could simply target blighted areas for eminent domain and 
create some affordable housing, a park, or improve public transporta-
tion access to a stadium project to overcome pretext challenges.207 As 
the Goldstein court explained, if a court finds sufficient public use, the 
court will not “give close scrutiny to the mechanics of a taking . . . as a 
means to gauge the purity of the motives of the various government 
officials who approved it.”208 One commentator notes this analysis al-
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lows classic public use to act as an “absolute shield” for “unlimited pri-
vate enrichment.”209 
 Although Kelo allowed economic development justifications for 
eminent domain actions, the Goldstein decision likely frustrates the in-
tent of the Takings Clause and the public-use analysis.210 Before the 
Kelo decision, lower courts acknowledging a pretext challenge did not 
interpret public use so broadly.211 For instance, in 99 Cents Only Stores v. 
Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, a California federal district court held 
that the traditional judicial deference to legislatures in determining 
public purpose was unnecessary when the justification is “demonstrably 
pretextual.”212 When the plaintiffs in Goldstein argued for pretext using 
similar reasoning, the Second Circuit rejected the approach.213 The 
court explained that the plaintiffs in 99 Cents specifically challenged 
whether any public use existed, whereas here, the Goldstein plaintiffs 
readily acknowledged that the project would result in some public bene-
fits.214 This distinction is likely a game of semantics, however, because 
even without the plaintiffs’ concession, the same public-use rationales 
would still exist.215 
2. Evidence Shows That Neither Highly Restrictive Eminent Domain 
Reforms Nor Lax Regulations Adequately Protect Public Use 
 Currently, the Castle Coalition, an organization dedicated to pur-
suing stronger eminent domain laws, notes that forty-four states have 
passed some form of eminent domain reform, and it gave twenty-nine 
of those states a passing grade.216 One reform approach involves draw-
ing clear lines establishing when eminent domain can and cannot be 
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used.217 This was the approach Florida took, where voters passed emi-
nent domain reform and adopted a constitutional amendment barring 
both economic development and blight takings without a three-fifths 
majority in the legislature.218 The state also prohibited previously ac-
cepted public purpose rationales, such as removing blight or public 
nuisances, from eminent domain actions.219 The Castle Coalition called 
the new laws “sweeping reforms [that produced] . . . some of the best 
protection in the nation.”220 
 Although Florida has an “A” grade from the Castle Coalition, one 
commentator has criticized the reform, arguing that it prevents “bene-
ficial takings,” including constructing sports arenas.221 Such hard-line 
rules may protect the public from eminent domain, but in doing so, 
the balance may swing too far, effectively preventing legitimate tak-
ings.222 The only options for stadium projects become limited: either 
the facility becomes a government-run development, or economically 
advantageous projects cannot be built.223 Furthermore, after the re-
forms, some city officials in Florida are disdainful, arguing that the new 
laws violate the government’s right to conduct constitutional takings.224 
 Conversely, New Jersey received an “F” grade for failing to enact any 
sort of eminent domain legislation after Kelo.225 But there is evidence 
that New Jersey’s experience with lax eminent domain laws has resulted 
in an economic boom because of its stadium projects.226 For sixteen 
years, Trenton was the only capital city in the United States without a 
hotel.227 After several stadiums were constructed, beginning in the 
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1990s, new development began pouring into the state: Marriott opened 
a new $60 million hotel in 2002, an $18 million shopping complex was 
opened in the area, and Manex, a special effects company, built a $60 
million production complex across from one of the stadiums.228 
 Despite New Jersey’s economic success, critics argue that there are 
too many eminent domain condemnations in the state.229 In 2007, 
Ronald Chen, the state’s public advocate, released a report detailing 
eminent domain abuse by local municipalities.230 It cited takings based 
on bogus blight determinations, due process deprivations, inadequate 
compensation and relocation assistance, and potential conflicts of in-
terest.231 After reviewing the case law, the report cited “startling injus-
tices” that revealed “a system that lacks the basic protections necessary 
to prevent such injustices.”232 
B. Massachusetts as a Guide for Stadium Construction Legislation 
1. Traditional Public-Use Analysis Should Guide State Legislatures in 
Stadium Construction Projects 
 Meaningful eminent domain rules for stadium projects should 
clearly define how a stadium satisfies the public-use requirement. Across 
many states, governments currently approve stadium projects under a 
broad understanding of economic development.233 Such an approach, 
however, can lead to disastrous consequences.234 One writer, in an arti-
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2013] Public Use Limits in Stadium Eminent Domain Takings 481 
cle discussing the Washington Nationals baseball park wrote, “[w]e all 
know that stadiums rarely spur economic development. We all know 
they often don’t lead to success in the standings . . . . The only guaran-
tee to a new stadium is the profits it generates for the owners.”235 
 In Massachusetts, the government gives stadium projects lower 
priority than other public policy goals such as health care and afford-
able housing.236 Instead of precluding all public funding for stadium 
projects, however, the Commonwealth recognizes the value of sports to 
the community and selectively funds certain parts of a project.237 The 
legislature does so by conducting a traditional public-use analysis, 
where it funds only infrastructure and utility improvements, such as 
sidewalks, parking lots, roads, sewers, and traffic signals.238 
 This approach embraces traditional understandings of public use 
as defined in earlier Supreme Court decisions such as Berman v. Parker 
and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.239 The novelty of the Massachu-
setts application is how it applies the traditional public-use analysis to a 
complex, quasi-private project such as a stadium. Many states conduct 
the analysis with an either/or proposition—either the municipality 
funds a large portion of a stadium, or it declines entirely, thus losing 
the team.240 Massachusetts balances public use with the interests of the 
franchise by exercising its powers only in aspects where public use has 
been traditionally accepted.241 In doing so, stadium projects can move 
forward, but in a way that is more consistent with the traditionally un-
derstood purpose of eminent domain laws.242 Another advantage to the 
Massachusetts approach is that public use is also protected through 
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provisions in the legislation authorizing rent charges or tax hikes on 
private parties that benefit.243 
2. Limiting Stadium Legislation to Traditional Public Use Protects 
Pretext Challenges in Eminent Domain Actions 
 One of the biggest challenges the plaintiffs in Goldstein encoun-
tered was that the project’s footprint included both heavily blighted 
and non-blighted areas.244 The court reasoned that because the city 
had already designated a portion of the project’s area as blighted, the 
state could condemn un-blighted parcels “as part of an overall plan to 
improve a blighted area.”245 As discussed earlier, this all-or-nothing ap-
proach gave private beneficiaries and the state legislature protection 
from a pretext challenge because a portion of the project fell under 
classic public use.246 When the town of Springfield attempted a similar 
strategy in City of Springfield v. Dreison Investments, Inc., the Massachusetts 
Superior Court rejected the approach, stating that its eminent domain 
action was invalid, even though it was for municipal purposes.247 
 The result in Dreison is instructive because it highlights how Massa-
chusetts courts interpret public use in light of economic development 
justifications.248 The Supreme Court has established that government 
cannot take private property for the sole purpose of conferring a bene-
fit on a private party.249 The problem with stadium projects is that al-
though almost every sports franchise is privately owned,250 states and 
municipalities experience tangible economic benefits as a result of sta-
dium deals.251 The proper approach to determine whether there is val-
id public use in an eminent domain action comes from Massachusetts. 
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As seen in the Foxboro Stadium Act and Fenway Park Act, the state leg-
islature funds only portions of the project that meet a traditional pub-
lic-use test; the rest must be privately funded.252 
 Applying the Massachusetts approach to the Goldstein case could 
have preserved pretext and public-use challenges.253 The Goldstein deci-
sion received criticism because the court’s reasoning could effectively 
neutralize even strong eminent domain protections, such as those in 
Florida.254 Under the Goldstein court’s analysis, projects designed pri-
marily for private parties can simply include any classic public use, such 
as new streets and roads, to avoid any constitutional challenges.255 Un-
der the Massachusetts framework, the concerns about allowing classic 
public use to be included as an incidental benefit to a stadium project 
could be avoided.256 
 Of course, there is always the possibility that government agencies 
could get a blight designation for a majority of the land desired by pri-
vate parties.257 Such a concern, however, is less likely in Massachusetts 
because stadium legislation explicitly delineates what qualifies as public 
use.258 By limiting the definition of public use, expenditures of public 
funds and eminent domain takings will almost always satisfy public-use 
requirements, while allowing stadium projects to commence.259 In cases 
where principles outlined in Opinions of the Justices are not properly en-
acted, such as the Dreison case, courts will declare the project unconsti-
tutional.260 Thus, a court applying Massachusetts public-use principles 
to Goldstein would have aligned the reasoning with Kelo, preventing a 
transfer of property that “would certainly raise a suspicion that a private 
purpose was afoot.”261 
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Conclusion 
 Although it remains to be seen whether the Nets will find greater 
sports success in a new city and arena, the legal proceedings behind the 
move sets an extremely difficult precedent for plaintiffs challenging 
future eminent domain actions. In Goldstein v. Pataki, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that any classic public-use rationale was a 
“complete defense” to a public-use challenge.262 Multi-purpose stadium 
developments, which inevitably require large infrastructure improve-
ments and public accommodations, will always satisfy Goldstein’s re-
quirements. 
 Massachusetts’s experience upgrading Fenway Park and passing 
legislation for a new football stadium is instructive. The Common-
wealth follows principles that find a middle ground between public 
purpose and private benefit for sports franchises. The Massachusetts 
approach limits expenditures of public funds on stadium projects to 
those portions that are a traditional public use. At the same time, the 
Commonwealth also ensures a stream of revenue from private benefici-
aries to recover its expenditures through taxes and lease agreements. In 
the eminent domain context, these principles give the Commonwealth 
the flexibility of acquiring land for public use, such as parking and in-
frastructure improvements, while leaving private parties responsible for 
the bulk of the stadium. 
 This approach has not hurt the teams that play in Massachusetts, 
as the Commonwealth has the third most valuable NFL franchise,263 
the third most valuable MLB franchise,264 the fourth most valuable 
NBA franchise,265 and the fifth most valuable NHL franchise.266 Al-
though there are numerous factors that go into creating a successful 
sports franchise, these Massachusetts teams have found economic suc-
cess while protecting taxpayers and the Commonwealth. 
                                                                                                                     
 Many states are still trying to find a balance between satisfying pri-
vate, profit-driven sports franchises and the public. Some states enacted 
 
262 See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 58–60 (2d Cir. 2008). 
263 NFL Team Valuations: #3 New England Patriots, Forbes.com, http://www.forbes.com/ 
lists/2010/30/football-valuations-10_New-England-Patriots_307338.html (last visited May 
17, 2013). 
264 MLB Team Values: The Business of Baseball, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/mlb-valu- 
ations/ (last visited May 17, 2013). 
265 NBA Team Valuations: #4 Boston Celtics, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/ 
32/basketball-valuations-11_Boston-Celtics_326173.html (last visited May 17, 2013). 
266 NHL Team Valuations: #5 Boston Bruins, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2010/ 
31/hockey-valuations-10_Boston-Bruins_313364.html (last visited May 17, 2013). 
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narrow redefinitions of public use that allow only a small category of 
projects to fall under eminent domain powers, while other states per-
formed no reform at all. Both approaches have seen some success, but 
critics note they either limit too many projects or influence out-of-
control eminent domain actions. By putting its focus directly on how to 
best maximize public use for what is inherently a private enterprise, 
Massachusetts fulfills its fiduciary duty to its citizens. 
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